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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

ABSTRACTS
Appeal and Error-New Trial Ordered as to Appealing
Defendant Only
P brought an action against D1 and D2, in the Circuit Court
of Monongalia County to recover damages for personal injuries and
property damage resulting from an automobile collision. P obtained
a judgment on a jury verdict for $10,000 against the Ds. D1
appealed on the ground that the trial court was in error in giving
instructions that urged the jurors who were in the minority to reexamine their views and also on the ground that the element of
proximate cause was not included in the binding instructions to the
jury. Held, reversed and a new trial ordered. The court stated that
the judgment against D2 would remain undistrubed because no
injustice would result from a reversal of the judgment only in part.
Levine v. Headlee, 134 S.E.2d 892 (W. Va. 1964).
This recent West Virginia case has shown that the question of
injustice to the defendant who did not appeal is the basic factor in
determining if the reversal for a new trial will affect only the
defendant who did appeal. For example, the court held in Armstead
v. Holbert, 122 S.E.2d 43 (W. Va. 1961) that where rights and
issues against several defendants are interdependent and injustice
might result from reversal as to less than all parties, the court in reversing for one or more defendants will reverse for all defendants.
The majority rule in the United States, which allows the court to
grant a new trial or reversal on appeal by only one defendant without
the grant of a new trial or reversal as to defendants not appealing,
is not a rigid rule without qualifications. All of these qualifications
or exceptions are based on the fundamental idea of according substantial justice to a codefendant as to whom, through no error was
committed, the judgment, if left intact, might work injustice. Annot.,
143 A.L.R. 7, 30 (1943).
It would seem that the reasoning of the principal case is in accord
with that of past cases in West Virginia and also with the majority
of jurisdictions in the United States.
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Gift Taxes-Construction of Split-Gift Code and
Regulations Provisions
Commissioner, respondent, argued that petitioner should be accessed gift taxes in the sum of $10,117.13 because the petitioner's
wife had not signed gift tax returns for the years 1956 and 1957
in the place provided to show her consent that her husband's gifts
were made one-half by her. Tax Court sustained the Commissioner.
Held, reversed, the wife's consent was sufficiently "signified" on
the returns and that no signature of the wife was required to give
this consent. Jones v. Commissioner 327 F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 1964).
At issue was the interpretation of the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2513, and the regulations dealing with the split-gift provisions in
petitioner's gift tax return. Treas. Reg. § 25.2513-2 (1958) provided
that where only one spouse files a gift tax return within the time
provided, the consent of both spouses shall be "signified" on the
return. In the principal case the wife of the petitioner had signed
her consent to a split-gift provision in earlier returns of the petitioner
and had never filed separate returns of the gifts. This, coupled with
the fact that petitioner "signified" his wife's consent in the returns
for 1956 and 1957 by answering "yes" to the question that he gave
his consent to have the gifts considered as having been made one-half
.by him and one-half by his spouse and by answering "no" to the
question whether his spouse would file a gift tax return, indicated to
the court that the consent of the wife had been "signified" to the
petitioner's assertion of a split-gift. The court has thus held that
one spouse may "signify" a consent for the other spouse in a gift
tax return.
Silence is quite frequently taken for consent in tax cases as was
shown in Hennen, 35 T.C. 747 (1961). There the court held a wife
liable on a joint income tax return even though she had not signed
it. Also, the court held that the true intention of the taxpayer was
the deciding factor in determining if it were a joint return.
Insurance--Insurer's Responsibility to Defend
P, assured, brought this action to recover from D, liability insurer,
the expense of defending a tort action against assured. The Superior
Court ordered judgment for P and D appealed. Held, affirmed. Because liability insurer could have included provisions concerning cost
of defense in various situations in covenant to defend under reserva-
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tion of right to disclaim liability, uncertainty
insurer, and insurer would be required to
assured's successful defense of tort action
accept insurer's defense under reservation.
Ins. Co., 195 N.E.2d 514 (Mass. 1964).
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would be resolved against
pay the legal expense of
after assured declined to
Magoun v. Liberty Mut.

An assured does not have to consent to a nonwaiver agreement
which provides that the insurer will defend a suit against the assured
but disclaims liability and retains its right to later assert the noncoverage. Once insurer makes it known that it wants to repudiate
its liability, it cannot insist on handling the defense, and insured may
have the insurer removed if it does insist on taking part in the litigation. Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 694, 700 (1956). It would then seem
that, because of the conflicting interests between insurer and assured,
assured did have the right to refuse the legal help of insurer. The
problem is to determine who should pay the expenses for the independent legal help acquired by assured.
The insurer did make a covenant to defend assured and an insurer
must defend the assured at least in good faith and without negligence.
Murach v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 339 Mass. 184, 158
N.E.2d 338 (1959). Because insurer did have the duty to defend
assured, the reasoning that insurer should pay the independent legal
expenses seems just in that insurer could have limited its covenant
to defend by expressing various situations when the covenant would
have no effect. The case of Stichman v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co.,
220 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) is in accord with the principal
case; the court held that if a liability insurer refused to defend a claim
against assured, insurer was liable for assured's attorney fees and
expenses of defense regardless of whether the cause of action was
within policy coverage. See Goforth v. Allstate Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp.
616 (W.D.N.C. 1963). No West Virginia cases were found on this
point.

Negligence-Governmental Immunity from Tort LiabilityEstoppel-Effects of Liability Insurance
P brought
when she fell
though it was
judgment in

this action against D, county, for injuries sustained
on a bridge which was controlled or maintained by D
not authorized to do so. Trial court granted summary
favor of D. P appealed to the Supreme Court of
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Appeals. Held, affirmed, D was immune from tort liability because
it could not be estopped from asserting its governmental immunity
from suit by reason of a legally unauthorized act by its officers or
agents. Also, the fact that D County had liability insurance was not
sufficient to take away this immunity from tort liability. Cunningham
v. County Court, 134 S.E.2d 725 (W. Va. 1964).
Except for a few jurisdictions, it is the general rule that counties
are not subject to liability for torts committed by it in carrying out
its governmental functions unless statutory provisions provide otherwise. Annot., 114 A.L.R. 420 (1938). West Virginia is in accord
with this view as was shown in Ward v. County Court, 141 W. Va.
730, 93 S.E.2d 44 (1956).
The general rule is that a county may not be estopped from
asserting its governmental immunity when functioning in its governmental capacity. Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 338 (1948). The parties in
the principal case apparently agreed that the maintenance of the
bridge was a governmental function. This general view is the same
as that of past West Virginia cases.
In the principal case, P contended that D had liability insurance
and this took away D's governmental immunity. The prevailing view
is that a governmental unit retains its immunity from tort liability
irrespective of liability insurance coverage. Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d
1439 (1959). Hence, the principal case is in accord with the
majority view on this point.
P did not seriously contend that the statute, W. VA. CODE ch. 17,
art. 10, § 17 (Michie 1961), which imposes liability on county courts
for injuries sustained through defects in roads or bridges controlled
by the county court, applied in the principal case. The court in the
principal case agreed that the statute had no effect because the defendant had no legal right, duty or authority to maintain, repair
and control the bridge.
William Walter Smith
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